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Abstract— In this paper, a new stream cipher is designed as 
a clock-controlled one, but with a new mechanism of altering 
steps based on system theory in such a way that the structures 
used in it are resistant to conventional attacks. Our proposed 
algorithm (PALS) uses the main key with the length of 256 bits 
and a 32-bit message key. The most important criteria 
considered in designing the PALS are resistance to known 
attacks, maximum period, high linear complexity, and good 
statistical properties. As a result, the output keystream is very 
similar to the perfectly random sequences and resistant to 
conventional attacks such as correlation attacks, algebraic 
attack, divide & conquer attack, time-memory tradeoff attack 
and AIDA/cube attacks. The base structure of the PALS is a 
clock-controlled combination generator with memory and we 
obtained all the features according to design criteria with this 
structure. PALS can be used in many applications, especially in 
financial cryptography due to its proper security features. 
Keywords— Stream Cipher, Nonlinear Combination 
Generators with Memory, Correlation Immunity, Nonlinearity, 
Linear Complexity, Computational Security, Resilient Function 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New stream ciphers have been designed for over four 
decades and never stopped. The reason is the need for new 
algorithms in different platforms, for organizations and 
governments and for updating and proving their resistance to 
various new attacks. Therefore, cryptographers always try to 
design new algorithms from different perspectives; some for 
higher security, some for more speed and some for utilizing 
fewer resources. Thus, the necessity of designing new 
algorithms is quite obvious. 
Stream cipher cryptosystems are one of the most 
important data encryption systems which have found 
significant application in strategic sectors. In a stream cipher 
system, plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom 
keystream to produce ciphertext [1]. If the keystream is a 
random sequence with independent components and uniform 
distribution, the ciphertext will not give any information to 
the attacker about the plaintext. In other words, the mutual 
information between the plain text and cipher text is zero 
and the system has complete security. Vernam or one-time 
pad system is the only system that works on this basis. Due 
to practical problems, this system is used in certain cases. 
Today, of course, due to the advancement of technology and 
the availability of ultra-large memory in small volumes, the 
practical use of this system has been facilitated. 
In practical systems, a pseudo-random generator is usually 
used to generate the keystream. The generator should be 
designed very similar to a BSS1 generator. In other words, 
the keystream should be the same as the perfectly random 
sequence. These generators produce sequences with 
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desirable statistical properties, such that it is impossible to 
achieve the main key from keystream. In general, the design 
approaches for keystream generators can be categorized into 
four categories [2, 3]: 
● Information theory 
● Complexity theory 
● System theory 
● Provably secure systems 
In the first approach, the design basis is mutual 
information between the plaintext and the cipher text. A 
cryptosystem is secure from the perspective of information 
theory, whenever the attackers cannot obtain any 
information about the probability distribution of possible 
messages in the cipher-text-only attack, despite their 
unlimited computational power. 
In the second approach, the design basis is the use of 
one-way functions. The main goal of the complexity theory 
is that the enemy with limited power cannot distinguish the 
keystream from a truly random sequence. Such a generator 
is called computationally secure. In order to implement this 
method, various criteria have been presented so far. 
In the system theory approach, the focus is on popular 
and well-known attacks. In this way, the design of a system 
is done in such a way that it is resistant to those attacks. A 
cryptosystem is called practically secure from the 
perspective of system theory, whenever it is not breakable 
by any known attack in a reasonable time. 
In the fourth approach, all attacks against the system are 
considered, with the difference that in this approach, a 
cryptosystem is provably secure, whenever a lower bound 
for the average computations required in each attack can be 
proved. It is also known as the unconditional security. 
Our proposed algorithm is designed based on system 
theory and the structures used in it are resistant to known 
attacks. 
 
II. DESIGN CRITERIA 
The most important criteria considered in designing the 
proposed algorithm are: 
● Maximum period 
● High linear complexity 
● Resistance to known attacks (correlation attacks, 
algebraic and time-memory tradeoff attacks) 
● Proper statistical characteristics 
It should be noted that the correlation attack is 
considered with its variants and derivatives such as fast 
correlation attack. The linear syndrome attack is a weak 
version of the fast correlation attack and need not be 
considered separately. The linear consistency attack is a 
divide & conquer technique, and it's enough to not use the 
structures that targeted the attack. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ALGORITHM  
Our goal in this paper is not to define and express a new 
perspective on the design of stream cipher algorithms, but 
we want to design a new algorithm with high security based 
on system theory in such a way that the structures used in it 
are resistant to conventional attacks. 
There are two major advantages to our proposed 
algorithm. First, we design a comprehensive algorithm 
(from A to Z) which describes every step, from the 
beginning of the message key generation until obtaining the 
final output keystream. The second advantage is the high 
security that has been proven in the security analysis section. 
In this section, threshold values have been obtained for all 
attacks that are considered as design criteria all of which are 
beyond the current computing power of the cryptanalysts. 
The structure of this algorithm is a little complex, which is 
also due to high security. 
 
Generally, it is not so complicated to achieve high linear 
complexity and maximum period, as well as appropriate 
statistical features in the design of stream ciphers [4], but the 
resistance to known attacks and powerful new attacks (that 
have been invented in various studies) is not simple and can 
be the most important and difficult part of the design. 
 
The base structure of the PALS algorithm is a clock-
controlled combination generator with memory [5, 6]. We 
have achieved all the features according to design criteria 
with this structure. In Fig. 1, a simple combination generator 
is shown. 
 
So far, using this combination and the proper design of 
the F function and LFSR’s, we will achieve maximum 
period, high linear complexity, as well as the appropriate 
statistical properties [18]. However, several attacks such as 
algebraic and correlation attacks are still applicable against 
this structure. In the following, we will protect this structure 
against these attacks by using other tools. 
 
A. Correlation Immunity 
Combination generators are vulnerable to the various 
types of correlation attacks [18]. So, to make these attacks 
infeasible, the combining function F should have a high 
correlation-immunity order [17]. But, there exists a tradeoff 
between the correlation-immunity order and the algebraic 
degree of a Boolean function. We can use memory to 
conquest this tradeoff [7-9]. Using a bit of memory, 
correlation immunity is obtained, and we used this solution 
in the PALS algorithm. 
In 2018, Deb et al. [6] proposed an LFER-based stream 
cipher which didn’t consider this property and their output F 
function is formed only by three input bits without memory. 
Thus, their scheme is vulnerable against correlation attacks. 
 
Fig. 1. Simple combination generator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Combination generator with memory 
Fig. 2 shows a combination generator with memory, 
where k is the number of inputs to the function f and m is 
the number of inputs to memory. 
 
In a linear attack, one can find a linear combination of at 
most m+1 consecutive output bits and a linear combination 
of maximum m+1 input vector sequences for an m-bits 
memory combination generator that correlate with each 
other. The main part of the linear attack [9], which is one of 
the most advanced correlation attacks, is the LSCA2 
algorithm for finding these linear transformations that have a 
complexity of order 2k+m. Considering the practical 
limitations, it is necessary to choose the value of m as small 
as possible and prevent the severe reduction of operational 
complexity of the linear attack with another trick. We will 
describe this trick in the next section. 
Another important point to be mentioned here is how to 
design and select f and g functions. These functions should 
have the proper characteristics that are [10]: 
1. The function f, the component functions of the vector 
function g, and also the linear combinations of these 
component functions should be balanced for any given 
fixed values of the input values  x1, … ,xk. 
2. The function f, the component functions of the vector 
function g, and also the linear combinations of these 
component functions should be balanced for any given 
fixed values of memory variables S. 
3. The function f, the component functions of the vector 
function g, and also the linear combinations of these 
component functions should have high nonlinearity. 
Finding the function f, which has the above features, is 
relatively simple. In other words, if we consider a stronger 
condition that the function f is an (n,1,t)-resilient function, in 
which t=max(m,k), then conditions 1 and 2 are easily 
satisfied for the function f. So, it is enough to find functions 
among the (n,1,t)-resilient function that has a high 
nonlinearity degree. 
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IV. BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS IN STREAM CIPHERS  
 
Boolean functions are commonly used in stream ciphers 
to combine the output of LFSRs. These output sequences 
will be a pseudorandom sequence after a transient state [6]. 
Definition 1: The Boolean function of n variables f is a 
function of the set F2n (all binary vectors with length n, such 
as x=(x1,…,xn)) to the field F2 = {0,1}. It should be noted 
that finding the proper Boolean functions of n variables for 
cryptographic usage is very time-consuming for large n in 
exhaustive search (the number of Boolean functions of n 
variables is equal to 22n). 
Definition 2: Assume that f is a Boolean function of n 
variables, then the following form is called the algebraic 
normal form (ANF) of the function f, 
f(x1,…,xn) = a0  (aixi)  (aijxixj)  …  a12…nx1…xn   (1)    
Where the coefficients ai are belong to the set F2={0,1}. 
Classical methods of designing Boolean functions can be 
divided into two categories: 
● The first method does not pay attention to the algebraic 
degree and assumes that the number of variables and 
correlation immunity order is fixed. 
● In the second method, the algebraic degree is taken into 
account; however, due to the Siegenthaler inequality 
[7], the maximum degree of algebraic value of an m-
resilient function of n variables is equal to n-m-1. 
 
 
In general, the necessary conditions to design Boolean 
functions in stream ciphers are balanced, high nonlinearity, 
high algebraic degree, and correlation immunity. The 
balanced and correlation-immune functions of order m are 
called m-resilient. With respect to the four mentioned 
properties [6,11-14], the best possible Boolean functions are 
designed in the PALS algorithm, i.e. they have a complex 
algebraic normal form with maximum nonlinearity, 
maximum algebraic degree, and at the same time, proper 
hardware implementation. 
 
 
V. DESCRIPTION OF THE PALS ALGORITHM  
 
A. Key Management 
The main purpose of PALS is to construct an infinite 
(computationally) pseudorandom sequence, using a finite-
length random sequence. Since the main key length of the 
encryption algorithm is 256 bits and much shorter than its 
initial state (1600 bits), this key must be extended by an 
appropriate method to obtain the initial vector. We also need 
to use a new key to encrypt each message, but we cannot 
change the main key for each message. Given these 
constraints, it is necessary to design a key generation 
algorithm that generates the initial vector by combining the 
main key of the system and a key called the message key. 
 
It should be noted that in [6], there is no description 
about how to extend the main key bits and also, there is no 
message key in that. Thus, each new message is encrypted 
with the same key. 
To do this, a session key is generated with the message 
key and the main key with the length of 256 bits. Then, the 
session key is expanded to 1600 bits (initial vector). The 
flowchart of initial vector generation is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Flowchart of Initial Vector generation 
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B. Message Key Generator 
The message key should be generated in such a way that 
it does not repeat during a period of main key change. If we 
assume that this algorithm is to be used 24 hours a day 
without interruption, and every second requires a 32 bits 
message key, after 4.25 years, a full period of the message 
key is generated and used and again returns to its initial 
state. Thus, the main key changeover period in this structure 
is up to 4.25 years. It's obvious that the main key should 
change much shorter than this period in cryptosystems. 
 
But anyway, the calculations show that if the main keys 
are changed in four years intervals, we will not be worried 
about creating repetitive session keys. In the PALS 
algorithm, an LFSR with the length of 32 bits is used to 
generate a message key, whose feedback function is the 
following primitive polynomial:  
 C(x)=x32+x29+x24+x23+x21+x19+x17+x16+x14+x13+x11+x9+x6+
x3+1  (2) 
C. Session Key Generator 
As previously mentioned, a scramble function must be 
designed to affect all the message key bits on the main key 
to generate the session key. With a fixed main key, the 
change of each message key bits should change each of the 
main key bits, with an average probability of 50% 
(Avalanche effect). This scramble function is created by a 
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substitution-permutation network (SPN). To do this, the 32 
bits message key is entered into a permutation box (P-Box) 
and a new 32 bits sequence is obtained. The resulting 32 bits 
are divided into 8 four-bit pieces, and each piece enters a 
substitution box (S-box4×4). The outputs of the S-boxes are 
concatenated respectively and produce a 32-bit sequence. In 
order to obtain good diffusion on all output bits by input 
changes, this operation must be repeated at least 5 times. As 
shown in Fig. 4, this iterative function is called Scram-5. 
Since the main key length of this algorithm is 256 bits, we 
need to use the Scram-5 function eight times to achieve a 
256-bit sequence. 
 
Fig. 4. Scramble function (Scram-5) 
The session key is obtained by bitwise XORing the resulting 
256-bit sequence with the main key (Fig. 5). 
 
 
D. Initial Vector Generator 
The length of the LFSRs used in the keystream generator 
is 1600 bits. So, we need a 1600-bit sequence for the initial 
state of them. As shown in Fig. 6, we used an LFSR of 256 
bits, a primitive polynomial of degree 256 and four S-boxes 
to generate the initial vector. 
The initial state of this LFSR is the 256-bit session key 
and generates eight bits at any clock. Four 8×8-bit S-boxes 
are embedded in the LFSR feedback function and one of 
them is selected and used to appropriate input-output 
diffusion. 
The content of stage 128 and 129 are used to select one 
of the S-boxes (the sequence 00 will select the first S-box, 
01 the second S-box, 10 the third S-box, and 11 the fourth S-
box). After generating 320 bits (40 clocks), diffusion is 
achieved with 95% confidence. Therefore, it is necessary to 
discard the first 320-bit and the next 1600 bits are used as 
the initial state of the keystream generator. 
In [6], the authors stated that all LFSRs are initially 
assigned with nonzero seed values. However, they didn’t 
propose a procedure for that. In fact, since there is no 
message key in the proposed algorithm of these authors, it is 
not explained about its diffusion and the number of bits to 
be discarded initially. 
 
 
E. How to Initialize the Keystream Generator 
To initialize eight LFSRs used in the PALS keystream 
generator, the first 165 bits of the session key is divided into 
163 three-bit sets as follows: 
{1,2,3}, {2,3,4}, {3,4,5}, ..., {163,164,165}. Each set 
represents a decimal number from 0 to 7 and specifies one 
of the 8 LFSR’s. For example, if the first set is 5, then the 
first bit of initial vector should be placed in the first stage of 
the sixth LFSR. Similarly, 163 bits of the initial vector is 
replaced in eight LFSRs. Then, the remaining 1437 bits of 
the initial vector is replaced in the empty stages of the 
LFSR’s, respectively. This routine is only used for the first 
message key at the beginning of the communication. If the 
message key is to be sent repeatedly when sending a 
message, in order to synchronization between the receiver 
and the transmitter, for the next message keys the initial 
vector is XORed to the content of each LFSR from 1 to 8, 
respectively. Since in the algorithm of Deb et al. [6], the 
main key bits directly construct the initial state of the 
LFSRs, the necessary complexity is not achieved and the 
cryptanalysts can obtain the relationship between input and 
output bits. In other words, the initial locations of the bits 
are clear in the output sequence. 
 
 
VI. KEYSTREM GENERATOR  
The main core of the keystream generator is contained 8 
LFSRs with lengths (239, 163,223, 181, 199, 173, 193, 229), 
which are relatively prime to each other. These LFSRs are 
clocked irregularly [17]. To do this, one of the 8×8-bit S-
boxes is selected, which was used in the initial vector 
generator. To select the S-box, the output bits of the first, 
third, fifth and seventh LFSR are XORed and placed to the 
left. The output bits of the second, fourth, sixth and eighth 
LFSR are also XORed and placed to the right. As a result, a 
two-bit sequence is obtained, representing a binary number 
between 0 and 3, which chooses one of the four S-boxes. 
The input of the selected S-box is the output bits of the eight 
LFSRs. The 8-bit output of this S-box specifies which 
LFSRs should be clocked in each step (the least significant 
bit of the S-box output, corresponds to LFSR number eight, 
and the most significant bit corresponds to the first LFSR). 
Then, using the majority function, it is determined which of 
these LFSRs should be clocked. For example, if the S-box’s 
output is 10111001, the first, third, fourth, fifth, and eighth 
LFSR are clocked and generate the new bit. The LFSRs that 
correspond to zero retain their previous value. It should be 
noted that since the number of LFSRs is even, all of the 
LFSRs will be clocked in the case of equality (four ‘0’ and 
four ‘1’). Eight bits of different stages of these LFSRs are 
taken as input for eight nonlinear Boolean functions with 
nonlinearity of 6 and correlation-immunity order of 2. Each 
of these functions has 9 input variables and the value of the 
ninth variable of each one is one bit of 8-bit S-box’s output. 
The least significant bit of the output goes to the function 
F1,…, the most significant bit goes to the function F8. The 
output of these eight functions enters to the 9-variable 
function g, which has the highest correlation immunity 
order. 
 Fig. 5. Session key generator using Scram-5 
 
Fig. 6. Initial Vector Generator 
 The output of the previous step of the nonlinear function 
h is used as the ninth variable of the function g. The output 
of the function g is the keystream, which should be XORed 
with the message (plaintext). The LFSR’s feedback 
polynomials are about half the length of their corresponding 
LFSR to resist against fast correlation attacks. 
 It should be noted that sparseness is an important issue in 
feedback functions that must be avoided, but in [6], the 
authors didn’t mention it. The keystream generator is 
depicted in Fig. 7. 
VII. ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF THE PALS  
In this section, some result of analytical evaluation about 
PALS is described. In our proposed algorithm, each of the 
2n−1 nonzero initial states of the non-singular LFSR of 
length n, produces an output sequence with maximum 
possible period 2n–1, because the feedback functions of 
LFSR’s are primitive polynomials [16]. Meanwhile, the 
lengths of all LFSRs are chosen from the prime numbers. 
So, considering the structure of the algorithm, its period is at 
least equal to the product of the individual period of them 
and is about 21600. The large number of states also 
completely eliminates the threat of time-memory tradeoff 
attack on stream ciphers. 
 
A. Relation of Correlation Immunity with Nonlinearity of 
Boolean Functions 
A non-linear function of n variables without memory has 
the correlation immunity of order m if the mutual 
information between the output variable Z and any subset of 
m input variable is equal to zero. 
 I(Z;xi1,…,xim)=0  ,  0≤i1≤i2<…<im≤n-1 (3) 
There is always a tradeoff between the nonlinearity of the 
function f, i.e. k, with the correlation immunity order m. If n 
is the number of input variables of the function f, then 
k+m≤n. When it is necessary that random output variable Z 
has uniform distribution (in cryptographic applications), this 
tradeoff will be: 
k+m≤n  for m=0 or m=n-1 
k+m≤n-1 for 1≤m≤n-2 
Therefore, with the increase of correlation immunity 
order, the nonlinearity order of the function f and also the 
linear complexity of the generator decrease and vice versa. 
Using a trick, one can get a function that has the maximum 
order of correlation immunity and maximum nonlinearity 
order at the same time. In fact, this tradeoff can eliminate, 
using a single-bit memory in the input variables of the 
function. In addition, the nonlinearity of the function has no 
limitations and can be freely chosen. The output combiner of 
the PALS, i.e. the g and h functions are designed in this 
way. The algebraic form of these functions is as follows: 
 hi=X1+X2+X5+X5X3+X6X4+X7X0+X7X1+X7X5+X8X0
+X8X2+X8X7X0+X8X7X1+X8X7X3X2+X8X7X4X2+X8
X7X4X3X2+X8X7X5X2+X8X7X5X3X2+X8X7X5X4X2+
X8X7X5X4X3X2+X8X7X6X2+X8X7X6X3X2+X8X7X6
X4+X8X7X6X4X2+X8X7X6X4X3+X8X7X6X4X3X2+X8
X7X6X5+X8X7X6X5X2+X8X7X6X5X3+X8X7X6X5X3
X2+X8X7X6X5X4+X8X7X6X5X4X2+X8X7X6X5X4X3+
X8X7X6X5X4X3X2  (4) 
 g=X0+X1+X2+X3+X4+X5+X6+X7+hi-1 (5) 
To increase the speed of software implementation, the 
truth table of the above functions can be used in the form of 
lookup tables. 
B. Correlation Immunity in PALS 
To show the strength of the algorithm against analytic 
correlation attacks, we first need to calculate the total 
number of possible keys to construct the initial state of the 
algorithm. To do this, we need to compute the number of 
available feedback polynomials and the number of possible 
initial states for each LFSR. The number of feedback 
polynomials of degree Li is:  
 Ui = [φ(2Li-1)]/Li (6) 
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So the total number of the keys is equal to: 
 ΠUi × (2Li-1) (7) 
Assuming that the initial state and polynomial feedback 
of each LFSR can be calculated separately, the total number 
of keys will be equal to: 
 ΣUi × (2Li-1) (8) 
As a result, the total number of the PALS’s keys is equal 
to:  
 2238 × (2239-1) +…+2228 × (2229-1) > 2477 (9) 
Therefore, a simple correlation attack against the 
algorithm is impossible (computationally) and PALS has the 
practical security against this attack. In general, any kind of 
fast correlation attack against the PALS is impractical due to 
the clock control structure of the algorithm, the use of dense 
feedback polynomials, the use of correlation immune and 
nonlinear functions and the large 1600 bits initial state of the 
algorithm.  
C. Algebraic Attack 
An algebraic attack attempts to construct the keystream 
of the algorithm by establishing a relationship between each 
output and input bit of the algorithm. Therefore, any simple 
relation between the input and output bit of the algorithm 
should be eliminated [15]. In the PALS algorithm, the 
method of initialization (first 163 bits of LFSRs), irregular 
clock structure and the use of the output of nonlinear 
functions instead of direct use of the LFSRs outputs on the 
input of the function g, creates necessary complexity, and 
the attackers cannot actually find a relationship between 
input and output bits, because the initial location of the bits, 
LFSR’s number, stage and clock of LFSRs are unclear in 
output sequence.  
D. Times-Memory Tradeoff Attack 
This attack is based on the birthday paradox.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Keystream Generator 
The birthday paradox is often used to show how much 
data should be stored in memory to achieve a certain 
probability of success of the attack. By choosing n random 
bits as the initial state, it produces n bits of keystream and 
compares it with the content which was previously stored in 
memory (2m n-bit output sequence, m=n/2). If a match 
occurs, a state of the system is obtained. In the event of the 
failure at this stage, a new n random bit is used and this 
procedure is repeated. The memory and computational order 
of this attack are obtained from the following relationships:  
 T=O(n+m2)(2m+2n-m) (10) 
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 M=O(n+m)(2m) (11) 
The initial state of the PALS algorithm is 1600 bits and 
the value of m is equal to 800. So, the memory and 
computational order to implement the time-Memory tradeoff 
attack against the algorithm is equal to:  
 T=O(1600+8002)(2800+21600-800)=2820 (12) 
 M=O(1600+800)2800)=2810 (13) 
These amounts of memory and computational order are 
too large enough and the attack is impractical.  
E. Divide & Conquer Attack 
This attack is based on the idea of time-memory tradeoff 
attack, and according to the above illustrations, its 
preprocessing time, processing volume, and memory 
requirements are all larger than 2500 and obviously the divide 
& conquer attack is also impractical against the proposed 
algorithm.  
F. Distinguishing Attack 
This attack attempts to obtain the initial state of the 
algorithm by taking a long sequence of output bits. Since the 
linear complexity of this algorithm is greater than 10480, 
assuming that the algorithm produces 1012 bits per second, 
after a period of 1000 years, the attackers will only have 
1022 output bits. Therefore, it is shown that this attack is not 
applicable to PALS.  
G. AIDA/cube Attacks 
AIDA/cube attacks [19] are generic key-recovery attacks 
that can be used to encryption algorithms without the need 
to know the internal structure of the algorithm. An important 
requirement is that the output from the generator can be 
represented as a low-degree decomposition multivariate 
polynomial in the algebraic normal form in the key and the 
plaintext. We assume the attacker is allowed to query the 
master polynomial (that is, a chosen-plaintext, chosen-IV 
setting) of its choice and achieve the resulting bit from the 
master polynomial. This way, the attacker achieves a system 
of polynomial equations in terms of secret variables only. 
The ultimate goal of the attack is to solve this system of 
equations, which reveals the key variables [20]. 
But the AIDA/cube attack is applicable on the algorithm, 
if the output keystream can be represented by a low degree 
multivariate polynomial. In other words, this attack is 
successful when applied to random polynomials of degree d 
over n secret variables, whenever the number m of public 
variables exceeds d + lognd. The complexity is 2d-1n + n2 bit 
operations, which is polynomial in n and low when d is 
small. The polynomials in PALS have degrees from 163 to 
239. For instance, the complexity of this attack is at least 
2162 bit operations that virtually make it impossible to 
implement in a reasonable time.  
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the wide use of stream ciphers in various 
applications, in this paper, we proposed a new stream cipher 
named PALS, which can be taken as a clock-controlled one, 
but with a new mechanism of altering steps. The Length of 
the main key is equal to 256 bits, but it can be 512 or 1024 
bits with a little change in initial vector generator. 
The most important criteria considered in designing the 
proposed algorithm are the maximum period, high linear 
complexity, resistance to known attacks and good statistical 
characteristics. The base structure of the PALS algorithm is 
a clock-controlled combination generator with memory and 
we obtained all the features according to design criteria with 
this structure. 
Our proposed algorithm is designed based on system 
theory and very similar to a BSS generator, so its keystream 
is like the perfectly random sequences and resistant to 
conventional attacks such as algebraic attack, time-memory 
tradeoff attack, divide & conquer attack, distinguishing 
attack, AIDA/cube attack, and various types of correlation 
attacks. 
We achieved a good avalanche effect (message key on 
the main key), using the substitution-permutation boxes 
repeatedly in the session key generator. Also, the use of 
Boolean functions (with appropriate cryptographic 
properties) increased algebraic degree and nonlinearity of 
the algorithm adequately. 
The main advantage of the proposed algorithm is the high 
security that has been proven in the security analysis section. 
In this section, threshold values have been obtained for all 
attacks that are considered as design criteria all of which are 
beyond the current computing power of the cryptanalysts. 
Due to the proper security features of the PALS, it can 
be used in many applications, especially in financial 
cryptography. As we evaluated PALS is secure against of 
well-known attacks. However, the extensive security 
analysis of any new cipher requires a lot of efforts from 
many researchers. We thus invite and encourage the readers 
to analyze the security of PALS.  
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